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Abstract 
The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is 
possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive 
with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the 
cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a 
conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary 
psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative 
reduction by means of functional sub-types is in principle repeatable down to molecular 
neuroscience. 
1. Functional reduction 
There are good arguments for taking the mind to be identical with the brain. In other words, 
any mental property token as described by psychology is identical with some configuration of 
neurobiological property tokens that can in principle be identified and described by a 
neuroscientific theory. It is common ground that (1) the mental strongly supervenes on the 
physical, that (2) every physical effect has a complete physical cause insofar as it has a cause 
at all and that (3) mental property tokens are causally efficacious. If one takes mental tokens 
not to be identical with configurations of neurobiological tokens, which are a sort of physical 
tokens, then one runs into what is known as the causal exclusion problem: assuming that a 
mental property token m1 causes another mental property token m2 (3), m1 can bring about this 
mental change only by bringing about a physical change as well (1), that is, by having a 
physical effect p2 that is sufficient as a supervenience basis for m2 (given suitable background 
conditions). However, given (2), there always is a complete physical cause p1 for p2: 
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Figure 1: The causal exclusion problem 
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Facing this situation, it is possible to maintain that mental causes overdetermine all the effects 
that they cause: for any effect of a mental cause m, there always is a physical cause p that is 
sufficient to ensure the existence of the effect in question. However, such a situation of 
overdetermination is indistinguishable from a situation in which the mental is epiphenomenal 
(that is, does not cause anything). Overdetermination therefore collapses into 
epiphenomenalism: there always are sufficient physical causes, and the physical laws prevail 
over the psychological or psychophysical ones, since they are strict and universal laws rather 
than ceteris paribus laws that admit of exceptions. The causal exclusion problem therefore is 
a strong argument for taking all mental property tokens to be identical with physical property 
tokens (Kim, 1998). If there is mind-brain identity, the problem of mental causation vanishes: 
some configurations of neurobiological property tokens are mental property tokens so that 
mental property tokens are causally efficacious because they are themselves something 
neurobiological. 
However, taking the causal argument to show that there is mind-brain identity does not 
answer the question how it is possible in concrete terms for the features that characterize 
something qua mental property token to be identical with a certain configuration of 
neurobiological tokens. The most promising answer to that question is functional reduction. 
The general account of functional reduction, also known as Ramsey-Lewis reduction, runs as 
follow. The first step consists in the functionalization of mental properties by defining them in 
terms of a characteristic causal role. Following Lewis (1994), common sense psychology 
conceives mental properties in terms of their characteristic effects (which can be mental as 
well as physical). The causal role in question is realized by certain configurations of 
neurobiological property tokens. The discovery of these configurations that make true the 
functional description of step (1) constitutes the second step. The description of these 
neurobiological configurations is no longer couched in a mental vocabulary, but in a 
neuroscientific vocabulary, and, in the last resort, in a physical vocabulary (say, of molecular 
neuroscience). Finally, it is in principle possible to explain in neuroscientific terms how the 
causal role is exercised that the mental description brings out in functional terms. 
Functional reduction thus shows how in each individual case a mental property token is 
identical with a configuration of neurobiological property tokens that brings about the effects 
due to which the token in question comes under a certain mental description. Functional 
reduction hence gives rise to lawlike, psychophysical generalizations: any neurobiological 
property token of the same type as the considered one, any N1, makes true an M, that is, a 
mental description of the same type as the considered one: 
(1) ∀x (N1x →  Mx). 
The symbol “∀” designs the universal quantification over a domain of individuals. 
Proposition (1) can be read in English as “For any property token x, if x falls under the 
neurobiological description N1, then x falls under the psychological description M.  
However, functional reduction faces a major problem: not any property token that makes true 
a mental description of the type M makes that description true because it makes true a 
neurobiological description of the type N1. The reason is that the mechanism to bring about 
the effects that define M does not have to be of the type N1, but it can also be of the type N2. 
This is what is known as multiple realization: configurations of property tokens of different 
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neurobiological types N1, N2, N3, etc. can all make true a mental description of one and the 
same type M because there are different mechanisms that all constitute minimal sufficient 
conditions to bring about the effects that define M. Consequently, there are also lawlike 
psychophysical generalizations of the type: 
(2) ∀x (N2x →  Mx). 
Hence, multiple realization excludes bi-conditionals between neurobiological and mental 
types of the following form: 
(3) ∀x (N1x ⇔ Mx). 
Functional reduction, as it stands, does therefore not amount to a theory reduction of 
psychology to neurobiology, and the identity of any mental property token with something 
neurobiological is stuck in limbo, for it is not supported by a type identity in the sense of a 
coextension between mental property types and neurobiological property types. 
Reacting to this situation by taking multiple realization to show that mental property tokens 
are after all not identical with configurations of neurobiological property tokens is no way 
out: they would then be epiphenomenal, as the problem of mental causation teaches us. The 
strategy of Lewis and Kim is to search for species-specific realizers of a given mental 
property type: the idea is that all the configurations of neurobiological property tokens that 
make true a description of the mental type M in a given species (or sub-species or still smaller 
group) are tokens of the neurobiological type N1. In that manner, psychology would be 
reduced to the neurobiological theory N1 in species S1, to N2 in species S2, etc. (Lewis, 1980; 
Kim, 1998: 93-95, 2005: 25). However, the unity of psychology gets lost in this strategy: 
there is no place for a psychology that seeks for generalizations that are valid across different 
species; psychology is in each case replaced with a neurobiological theory that takes its place 
for a certain domain, that is, a certain species, sub-species or even smaller group (cf. the so-
called new wave reductionism of Bickle, 1998). The general concepts or types of psychology 
do not have any scientific value (e.g. Kim, 1999: 17-18). We thus face a dilemma of either 
epiphenomenalism for mental property tokens or eliminativism of the scientific value of 
psychological types. 
A new strategy for developing functional reduction into a fully-fledged reduction despite 
multiple realization has been developed recently, seeking to avoid that dilemma by means of a 
conservative theory reduction (Esfeld and Sachse, 2007). That strategy is motivated by the 
observation that multiple realization arises from the fact that the mental, functional types of 
psychology are coarse-grained, whereas neurobiological types are much more fine-grained 
(Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). This is why the mental, functional types of psychology have a 
larger extension than the neurobiological ones. Against this background, the central idea of 
the new strategy is to define in the vocabulary of psychology more precise functional, mental 
sub-types that are in the end as fine-grained as the neurobiological types. The argument can 
be summed up in the following manner (Esfeld and Sachse, 2007: 5): 
1) Assume that two configurations of neurobiological property tokens, n1 and n2, fall under 
the neurobiological descriptions N1 and N2 and both make true the mental, psychological 
description M. There is in this case a systematic difference in the way in which n1 and n2 
bring about the effects that define M. In other words, the types N1 and N2 capture two 
different mechanisms of producing the effects that define M. 
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2) Any such difference in mechanisms leads to a systematic difference in the production of 
functional side-effects that are linked to the production of the effects characterizing M. 
For any of these differences, there are physically possible conditions under which those 
side-effects manifest themselves in a functional salient way, that is, in a way that is salient 
for psychology. Hence, it is possible to grasp those differences in a functional manner by 
making the functional, mental types of psychology more precise in their own vocabulary. 
3) On the basis of those side-effects and their manifestation under critical conditions, 
functionally defined sub-types M1, M2, M3, etc. of M can be constructed. All those sub-
types include the definition of M but are individuated by taking in a functional way the 
side-effects peculiar to each neurobiological type N1, N2, N3, etc. into account. For any 
functional, mental description M and any neurobiological description N1 whose referents 
make true M, it is in principle possible to conceive a functional sub-type M1 (of M) that is 
co-extensional with N1. 
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Figure 2: The reduction of psychology to neurobiology via functional sub-types 
 
Note that this procedure is repeatable. We can in principle construct functional sub-type M1a 
of functional sub-type M1 of M until our final sub-types are no longer multiply realizable, that 
is, are coextensive with neurobiological types. This improvement of functional reduction 
leads to the following two results: (1) It provides for (sub-)type-identities in the form of 
biconditionals, thereby making the reduction of psychology to neuroscience possible. (2) It 
yields a conservative reduction, establishing the scientific quality of the general types of 
psychology (and the lawlike generalizations couched in terms of them); for these are 
contained in the sub-types that are coextensive with neurobiological types and simply 
abstracted from them. Hence, psychology is vindicated as bringing out salient similarities 
across different species that neurobiology does not have the conceptual means to express, and 
psychology is systematically linked with neurobiology by means of a conservative, functional 
reduction via functional sub-types. 
That strategy of functional reduction has been applied to biology hitherto (Sachse, 2007). 
The goal of this paper is to extend it to the relationship between common sense psychology 
and neuropsychology. In sections 2 and 3, we will introduce a very simple example in order 
to show how this model can be applied to the relation between functionalized folk psychology 
comprehensive neuroscientific theory 
 Psycho-neural reduction through functional sub-types  5
and neuropsychology. Section 4 will then be concerned with the implementation of the sub-
types strategy of reduction in a case of more complex neuropsychopathology. 
2. Disconnection syndrome: split-brain patients 
The concept “inter-hemispheric disconnection syndrome” picks out a set of behavioural 
abnormalities arising, from the neurological point of view, from injuries or from a total lack 
of corpus callosum. The corpus callosum is a large medullary strip linking both hemispheres 
of mammalians brain allowing information exchange between the two hemispheres. It is 
composed of circa 200 to 800 millions commissural fibres that can be tied up in three main 
classes (Kolb and Whishaw, 2003: 428-430). Most of them are topographic in the sense that 
they connect nervous areas to their respective contralateral counterpart. A second group of 
connections goes to areas to which the homotopic area on the contralateral side projects and, 
finally, a last group of connections has diffuse terminal distributions. 
Damages to the corpus callosum can occur accidentally consequent upon congenital 
malformations or surgical ablation. Corpus callosum’s natural agenesis is one of the most 
common brain malformations observed in humans with a prevalence of 3-7 per 1000 
individuals (Bedeschi et al., 2006). The surgical removal of the corpus callosum, the 
therapeutic commissurotomy, has been reintroduced in the early sixties of the last century by 
the surgeons Philip Vogel and Joseph Bogen as an elective treatment for severe cases of 
epilepsy. The motivation for such a heavy and irreversible surgery lays in the interpretation of 
hard epileptic crises as an electro-magnetic storm spreading through all the brain from 
isolated sources of unrest (Purves et al., 2002). Removing the corpus callosum “helps to 
confine the epileptic seizure to one side and tends to preserve consciousness during an attack 
[…] and enables the patient to take precautionary or control measures at onset of a seizure” 
(Sperry et al., 1969: 274). 
Behavioural issues of commissurotomy have been extensively studied in medicine as well 
as in neuroscience since the re-introduction of the commissurotomy. The most surprising 
result of this surgery is the apparent lack of change with respect to daily life (Sperry et al., 
1969: 275). One year is in general required for recovery from the surgery. Within two years, 
patients are able to return to school or go to work to such an extent that a conventional 
medical examination cannot reveal anything extraordinary in the behaviour of these patients 
(Kolb and Whishaw, 2003: 433). One needs specific cognitive tests to detect differences 
between commissurotomized patients and healthy subjects from the behavioural point of view 
and to show that in the split-brain, each hemisphere processes separately one half of the 
information processed by the brain as a whole, leading to the conclusion that “in the split-
brain, each hemisphere can be shown to have its own sensations, percepts, thoughts, and 
memories that are not accessible to the other hemisphere” (Kolb and Whishaw, 2003: 433). 
Standard tests allowing to discriminate between split-brain and normal patients aim to 
determine whether sensory information presented to only one hemisphere is at disposal of 
both or only of one hemisphere for motor action. For instance, a very simple test consists in 
asking a blindfolded individual to touch an object with the left hand and to find a similar 
object in a hidden collection with the right hand (Kolb and Whishaw, 2003:437). As the left 
hand is under the somesthesic and motor control of the lone right hemisphere and vice versa 
for the right hand, in the absence of inter-hemispheric communication, split-brain patients are 
unable to match the objects correctly. Although we are not interested in developing all the 
 Psycho-neural reduction through functional sub-types  6
tests designed to capture behavioural specificities of split brain patients, let us consider in 
more detail the case of visual perception and recognition of objects. 
The connectivity of the human visual system is crossed in a very specific manner. Roughly 
speaking, visual information of the left visual hemifield is computed by the right hemisphere 
and vice versa. Of course, since this crossing concerns the visual hemifield and not the eyes 
themselves, the structure of the central visual pathway is quite sophisticated. Optical signals 
coming from the left visual field are received by the right half part of the retina of each eye. 
Both of them are connected to the right lateral geniculate nucleus through the optic nerves and 
the optic chiasm. From there, the information is transmitted by the optic radiations to the layer 
IV of the right visual cortex, namely the right striate cortex. 
However, in the case of normal agents, information stemming from a specific half visual 
field is available to both hemispheres by the way of two mechanisms. First of all, the corpus 
callosum connects both hemispheres together, tying up homologous areas of the left and the 
right hemispheres. Secondly, eyes keep scanning micro-movements permanently. These 
unconscious micro-movements have the effect of distributing a large part of the information 
stemming from the centre of the visual field to both sides of the visual system, which would 
otherwise be confined to a specific hemisphere. The existence of these scanning micro-
movements explains why split-brain patients are able to live quite normally as regards their 
visual abilities in spite of the lack of communication between both hemispheres. Since 
information stemming from the central part of the visual field is sent to each side of the visual 
cortex, left sided visual information can for instance be employed to form a verbal report, 
although the main speech area is principally left-sided. Scanning micro-movements provide 
therefore a natural and very powerful mechanism of compensation that enables split-brain 
patients to partially overcome their deficit of communication between hemispheres in the 
domain of visual perception. 
In the case of visual perception, classical tests run as follows (Sperry et al., 1969: 275-277). 
The subject is seated at a table and faces an adjustable screen that prevents her from seeing 
her hands. Images are flashed on one or the other half of the screen whilst the subject is asked 
to fix a red dot in the central part of the screen. Images are flashed during circa 1/10 seconds 
to prevent the scanning micro-movements of the eyes from transmitting information to both 
hemispheres. Visual material can in that manner be presented selectively to one specific or 
both hemispheres. Objects are placed on the table in the back of the screen in such a way that 
the patient can be asked to identify them just by touching them. The experimenter tries then to 
determine which visual information is at disposal of which hemisphere for motor action. 
In the execution of such tasks, commissurotomized patients appear to be essentially normal 
with respect to the right half visual field under these testing conditions. They can describe, 
read and use visual material in the same manner as before the surgery. However, if an image 
is flashed on the left side of the screen in a randomized sequence of stimulations, verbal 
reports of patients tend to show that they do not perceive the stimulus. If the time duration of 
the presentation of the stimulus is increased, patients are able to report what is presented in 
the left visual hemifield, relying on the mentioned compensation mechanism. It should be 
emphasized that commissurotomized patients do not recover their pre-surgery abilities in 
carrying out such tasks. Such behavioural consequences of commissurotomy seem to be 
definitive. 
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Looking at the permanent behavioural effects of the commissurotomy, these results could at 
first glance also be taken to indicate a defect in the right visual system of the patients. But 
further tests exclude this possibility: when non verbal responses are employed to evaluate 
patients’ perceptions, we can be sure that they understand the task and that they perceive and 
identify the stimulus. For example, if an image of an object is flashed on the left visual hemi-
field, in spite of the pathological incapacity of verbally reporting the stimulus, patients are 
nonetheless able to pick out by touch with the left hand a corresponding object in a collection 
of other items. Further tests demonstrate that right sided visual abilities of these patients are 
clearly unimpaired by the commissurotomy. A defect in verbal abilities is as well excluded 
since the subjects can produce complex verbal reports about right-sided stimulations. The 
cause of the disconnection syndrome appears therefore not to be a defect in primary sensory 
areas and the motor cortical area, but a defect within the information processing between both 
of them and more specifically to be the consequence of a lack of communication between 
both hemispheres. 
Let us sum this section up by emphasizing that a large variety of such visual tests confirm 
the conclusion that in the case of commissurotomized patients, visual information stemming 
exclusively from the left or the right half of the visual field is processed separately in each 
hemisphere. Normal interaction between elements within each half-field is preserved, but split 
brain patients cannot integrate information of both halves of the visual field. However, basic 
mechanisms allow these patients to lead a normal life, although their behaviour differs 
notably in many aspects once specific cognitive tests are employed. Using such cases as 
example, the next section of the paper is intended to make clear how the sub-type strategy of 
reduction can be applied to the relation between psychology and neuropsychology. 
3. Application of the sub-type strategy to the split-brain example 
Let us introduce the following example to get the application of the strategy of reduction by 
means of functionally defined sub-types started. Take the case of two pairs of individuals 
watching TV and discussing the content of a very attractive film. Each individual can be 
described in psychological terms as perceiving the TV screen and, from that point of view, 
each of them instantiates the same perceptual mental property. The first step of functional 
reduction consists in the functionalization of that mental property. The considered property 
can be functionalized as follows: 
 
(A) A subject S visually perceives an object x if, when she looks conspicuously at x and when 
she desires to give a verbal description of x, S verbally describes x in a successful manner. 
 
There are of course many other cases of perception, as common sense ascribes this type of 
mental state in a lot of other scenarios. For example, verbal report is not a necessary condition 
for perception. But our purpose here is not to provide an extensive functional definition of 
perception. A generic formulation of such functional descriptions can be given in the classical 
Ramsey-Lewis shape of theoretical concepts: 
 
(F) (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)((x is caused by environmental conditions c1 v c2 v … v cn) & (x tends to cause 
mental states y v z) & (x tends to cause behaviour b1 v b2 v … v bn)) 
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The symbol “∃” designates the existential quantification over a domain of individuals. 
Proposition (F) can be read in English as “There is a property token x, and there is a property 
token y, and there is a property token z, such that …”.  
The second step of functional reduction consists in the identification of physical truthmakers 
of (A). Let us now assume that one of the individuals in each pair is a split-brain patient. 
Nonetheless, (A) applies to both individuals in each pair. This is a clear case of multiple 
realization since one and the same functional description applies to individuals that come 
under two distinct neuropsychological descriptions. Let us also stipulate that the first pair of 
individuals is watching a perfectly normal movie and that the second pair is watching exactly 
the same movie, except that their version of the movie contains additional very short left-
sided apparitions of a given item. 
Since split-brain patients and normal individuals are neurophysiologically different, visual 
information is not processed by their respective brains in the same way. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, these differences can be detected behaviourally only in specific 
circumstances. Accordingly, the following situation is perfectly possible. Within the first pair, 
both the normal and the split-brain person behave in exactly the same way. Both of them 
perceive and comment the movie in exactly the same manner. However, within the second 
pair, the behavioural capacities of both individuals differ clearly. The normal subject 
perceives and comments the movie being able to describe left-sided and short apparitions 
that characterize the version of the film they are watching. The split-brain patient of that pair, 
however, perceives and comments the movie without being able to describe left-sided and 
short apparitions. Such behavioural differences are nothing but the side-effects we mentioned 
in section 1. They enable us to construct functional sub-types of the considered functional 
type by including behavioural differences in order to make our psychological descriptions 
more fine-grained. We thus get to the formulation of two new functional descriptions: 
 
(A’) A subject S visually perceives a movie if, when she looks conspicuously at the movie and 
when she desires to give a verbal description of it, S verbally describes the movie in a successful 
manner including possibly the description of left-sided apparitions of less than 1/10 second. 
 
(A’’) A subject S visually perceives a movie if, when she looks conspicuously at the movie and 
when she desires to give a verbal description of it, S verbally describes the movie in a successful 
manner excluding systematically the description of left-sided apparitions of less than 1/10 
second. 
 
The starting point was that the coarse-grained functional description (A) applies to all the 
individuals considered in our example. However, the more fine-grained description (A’) 
applies in the second pair only to the normal individual, since the split-brain patient is unable 
to verbally report the short and left-sided apparitions. Consequently, the description (A’’) by 
contrast to (A’) applies to her. 
Let us emphasize that this result is precisely what is required for applying the strategy of 
reduction by means of functional sub-types. Adding functional specifications to the general 
description at the outset has the consequence of reducing the extension of that description. Of 
course, description (A’’) does not apply only to split-brain patients watching TV. There could 
be several other cases in which an individual is unable to notice the brief and left-sided 
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apparitions. Nonetheless, we would be able to introduce some further specifications of the 
functional description (A’’) in order to narrow down its extension in an even more fine-
grained manner. For example, having distinct memories and motor abilities (Kolb and 
Whishaw, 2003: 433), the split-brain patient of the second pair is able to draw the object of 
the mentioned apparitions or to pick out a similar object in a hidden collection with the left 
hand, because this hand is under control of the right hemisphere, which is in possession of 
visual information relative to the apparitions. Sharpening in that manner the grain of our 
functional descriptions, it will be possible to capture precisely the behavioural particularities 
of a split-brain patient, namely e.g. the inability to successfully match sensory information 
originating solely from one side of the body with similar information originating from the 
other side. In other words, introducing functionally defined sub-types for both normal and 
split-brain patients enables us to reach the required condition for intertheoretic reduction, 
namely co-extensionality and thus bi-conditional bridging principles. Furthermore, 
neuroscience explains why the truthmaker of each functional sub-description produces a 
specific behaviour. We are thus able to meet the requirement of the third step of functional 
reduction. 
Reductionism is often understood as implying the replacement or elimination of higher 
level generalizations by more precise and reliable generalizations at a lower level of 
description because through reduction the pattern of similarities brought out by the higher 
level generalizations is lost. However, the strategy of reduction by means of functionally 
defined sub-types has the resources to avoid such a loss. As the discussed example shows, 
definition (A) is preserved as a perfectly valid and well grounded high level (abstract) 
generalization by retaining functional specifications that are common to both definitions (A’) 
and (A’’). In other words, definition (A) stands in a relation of abstraction with respect to 
definitions (A’) and (A’’). The core of this abstraction consists in the pruning of the 
functional specifications that distinguish between the many realizers of a given higher level 
property. Introducing functional sub-types makes therefore room for a reductionist but 
conservative position with respect to the higher level generalizations of psychology, since the 
commonalities shared by the different realizers of a psychological property are characterized 
in a functional manner. 
4. Critical conditions of manifestation and the quest for the localization of functions 
The approach introduced in the preceding section depends crucially on the possibility of 
finding adequate testing conditions that bring out the functional side-effects discussed in 
section 1 in order to be able to discriminate from a purely behavioural point of view between 
the physically different truthmakers of a given mental description. What is required is that for 
each realizer pn falling under the functional type F, there is at least one set of environmental 
conditions conceivable in which the specific way that pn employs to bring about the effect 
characterizing F can be grasped from the psychological point of view, that is, by looking just 
at the behaviour. The question remaining at this stage is whether it is possible to find such 
environmental conditions for any specificity that is relevant from the point of view of 
neuropsychology, that is, for any neuropsychological type of realizer of a given functional 
type F. 
A rather trivial way to answer this question consists in relying on the definition of 
neuropsychology given by Kolb and Whishaw, namely the “study of the relation between 
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human brain function and behaviour” whose “central focus is the development of a science 
of human behaviour based on the function of the human brain” (2003: 2). From that point of 
view, neuropsychology is based on the fundamental premise that a systematic relation 
between brain specificities and behavioural specificities exists, and neuropsychological types 
are constructed in order to group under common descriptions different patterns of behavioural 
specificities that share a particular cause at the neurological level. It is then obvious that for 
any neuropsychological type realizing a given mental property, there are behavioural 
differences in the execution of some cognitive tasks. 
A more sophisticated answer consists in looking in detail at the daily scientific practice. For 
instance, neuropsychologists typically try to locate the execution of cognitive functions within 
the brain. Focusing on that goal, their experiments are designed to create a statistically 
significant contrast between control subjects and pathological or medicated patients precisely 
in order to show the causal impact of neural differences on the production of behaviour. In 
other words, they aim to create a contrast between the following two pairs of correlations: on 
the one hand a correlation between the level of performance presented by control subjects in 
the execution of a given cognitive task and their intact neurological structures; on the other 
hand a correlation between the production of behavioural particularities by tested patients in 
the execution of the very same task and their neurological particularities. 
The localization of cognitive functions has been pursued for a long time by comparing 
healthy brains and behaviour with pathological cases through a post-mortem investigation of 
the brain structure. The history of neuroscience contains several examples of that method, 
such as the double dissociation between the lexical function of Wernicke’s area and the 
syntactical function of Broca’s area. Damages to the Wernicke area cause impairment in 
language understanding and in the production of meaningful sequences of words. Damages to 
the Broca area tend to cause impairments with respect to the syntax and the fluency of speech 
and difficulties in the understanding of grammatically complex sentences. Such dissociations 
remain the basis for the localization of cognitive functions, albeit the recent development of 
modern neuroimaging multiplies the possibilities of investigation. Neuroimaging enables 
scientists to observe directly the neural activity and, in that manner, to establish a correlation 
between a specific result in the execution of a behavioural task and a particular neural 
activation or lack of activation. 
In order to establish such correlations, the key issue is to design an experimental set up that 
asks the subjects to execute a certain task that comes as close as possible to the cognitive 
function that the cerebral area in question is presumed to implement. The difficulty for 
neuroscientists consists therefore, firstly, in making good hypotheses about cognitive 
functions, that is, in developing a model of brain information computation using the right 
taxonomy of functions and mechanisms (Craver, 2007: 128), and, secondly, in finding an 
experimental protocol that requires of subjects precisely the execution of that very function. 
Neuroscientists then are able to correlate behavioural results with patterns of neural activities. 
Take as example of a complex neuropsychological pathology the case of Schneiderian 
schizophrenia and the recent developments in the identification of the neural mechanisms of 
recognizing self-generated actions. From the cognitive point of view, the central monitoring 
hypothesis constitutes the current general framework for understanding the mechanism of 
recognition of self-generated actions. Roughly, the idea is that “each time the motor centres 
generate an outflow signal for producing a movement, a copy of this command (“the 
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efference copy”) is retained. The reafferent inflow signals are compared with the copy. If a 
mismatch arises between the two types of signals, new commands are generated until the 
actual outcome of the movement corresponds to the desired movement” (Jeannerod, 2003: 8). 
Self-generated actions recognition is based in that framework on the concordance between a 
desired action and its predicted sensory consequences. 
Defectiveness of theses mechanisms leads to cognitive impairments characterizing 
Schneiderian schizophrenia, such as auditory hallucinations, thought insertion, feeling of 
other’s influence on the patient’s thoughts, actions and emotions (Farrer et al., 2004: 31). For 
example, auditory hallucination such as voices hearing are explained within the framework of 
the central monitoring hypothesis as a pathological incapacity of the patient to recognise inner 
speech as her own (Franck et al., 2001). The motor areas are engaged offline in order to 
generate an inner linguistic representation (the inner speech), but the auditory cortex 
interprets this activity as if it were produced by an external cause (Jeannerod, 2003: 14). 
Schizophrenia appears that way as a pathology affecting the communication and the 
comparison of information between motors and sensory area. 
In order to investigate the localization of the mechanisms of self-generated action 
recognition, many successive experimental designs have been set up (for a review, see 
Jeannerod, 2003). Farrer et al. (2004) designed an experiment whose central idea was to 
develop a task requiring of the subject to mobilise nothing but the execution of the 
investigated cognitive function, namely the comparison between a motor command and its 
intended result. The experimental set up used was one in which both healthy subjects and 
pathological patients had to judge whether or not the images displayed on a screen were 
effects of their own manipulations of an out-of-vision joystick. The experimenter was able to 
vary the degree of discrepancy between patient’s inputs and visual output on the screen. 
Without entering in more details with respect to this experiment let us highlight two points. 
First of all, brain imagery study of healthy subjects enables neuroscientists to correlate a 
task execution with a delimited pattern of neural activity. In the case of the studies of Farrer, a 
correlation has been reported between the degree of control by the subjects of the perceived 
movement on the screen and the activation of the right angular gyrus (Farrer et al., 2003; 
Farrer et al., 2004: 37), particularly of Brodman area 39 and 40 on the right side (reported in 
Jeannerod, 2003: 9). Maximal activation occurred when the movements shown to the subject 
were unrelated to the subject’s own movements. 
However, this correlation does not establish beyond doubt that the considered area is 
causally responsible for the correct task execution. It’s only once one can compare, and that’s 
here our second point, the results obtained with healthy subjects with results of impaired 
patients that the relation between neural activity and behaviour takes the form of a 
counterfactual dependency that makes it possible to consider the localized neural activity as a 
genuine cause of the observable behavioural particularity, which is precisely the result 
obtained by Farrer’s research group. Schizophrenic patients perform the experimental task 
very poorly, showing that they encounter difficulties in distinguishing self-generated 
movements from alien generated movements, while exhibiting an aberrant activity of the right 
angular gyrus in the very same experimental conditions (Farrer et al., 2004: 37, 42). 
This result confirms the hypothesis that the right angular gyrus is the locus of the 
comparison between efferent copy and reafferent signal (Jeannerod, 2003: 9) and, by the way, 
they contribute to the current explanation of the schizophrenia disease. Hallucinations and 
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delusions are understood in terms of abnormal interactions between different cortical areas. 
This dysfunctional integration is explained at the cognitive level, in the framework of the 
central monitoring theory, as a failure to integrate perception and action; at the physiological 
level, it is considered to be a defect in connectivity (Farrer et al., 2004: 41). This abnormal 
connectivity “disrupts the modulation by frontal region of those more posterior brain areas 
involved in the processing of the sensory consequences of an action” (Farrer et al., 2004: 41), 
making it difficult to identify the source of the perception as internal or external. The 
incriminate absence of modulation then causes the primary sensory area relative to the 
perceptive modality in which the hallucination occurs to process the sensory consequence of 
action as if it were the result of an external cause (Blakemore et al., 2000, Frith and Dolan, 
1996). 
Let’s return to the functionally defined sub-types strategy. The discussed example of 
complex neuropsychological pathology enables us to make the following remarks. First of all, 
a research programme like the one of Farrer relies on the possibility of finding critical testing 
conditions that provide an empirical feedback with respect to the hypothesis about the 
cognitive sub-functions that together compute the studied cognitive ability, namely here the 
set of sub-functions taken for granted by the central monitoring hypothesis and the ability of 
recognising self-generated actions. As said above, this possibility is open ipso facto in cases 
of schizophrenia and other neuropsychopathologies, since all of these concern cases in which 
the impairment is observable from the behavioural point of view.  
Second, the cognitive tests used by neuropsychologists capture critical conditions that 
enable us to establish a contrast at the physiological level that mirrors the contrasted results 
obtained at the behavioural level. These critical test conditions are precisely the salient 
conditions required in order to construct functionally defined sub-types. In the case of 
schizophrenia, healthy and pathological subjects are clearly distinguishable by means of their 
results in the test used in the experiments of Farrer’s research group. Since the results of these 
tests are graspable from a behavioural point of view, they can be employed in order to make 
the mental functional definitions more precise, as explained in the case of split-brain patients. 
Of course, the detailed functional reports at issue in the case of such a complex pathology as 
schizophrenia will be much more complex. However, this is a practical in contrast to a 
principled problem. 
The requirements of the reduction strategy by means of functionally defined sub-types are 
thus met. The possibility of constructing sub-types exists for complex neuropathology with 
the result that one can obtain fine-grained psychological descriptions that are coextensive 
with neurological descriptions. In fact, neuroscience makes considerable progress in view of 
producing reductive explanations of the neural causes of pathologies such as schizophrenia. 
The strategy of reduction by means of functional sub-types makes it possible to receive this 
progress in a conservative rather than an eliminativist manner: the classifications in mental 
terms get their scientific quality vindicated by being systematically linked with 
neuropsychological classifications via mental, functional sub-types. 
At this point, it should be clear that there is no principled objection to applying the 
procedure to any pathology within neuropsychology, that is to any pathology whose effects 
are observable from the behavioural point of view. Hence, it is in principle possible to 
introduce a functionally defined sub-type of a mental type for each type of a 
neuropsychological realizer, that is for normal individuals in contrast to split-brain or 
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schizophrenian patients, but also for neglect patients, blind-sighted patients, and so on. What 
is required is just to sharpen in the following way the functional reports, using the behavioural 
testing tools of neuropsychology: 
 
(F’) (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)((x is caused by environmental conditions c1 v c2 v … v cn) & (x tends to cause 
mental states y v z to occur) & (x tends to cause behaviour b1 v b2 v … v bn)) + further 
descriptions of actual causes + further descriptions of mental states implicated + further 
descriptions of actual behavioural effects of x.  
 
This sharpening is possible because all neurological pathologies induce specific behavioural 
effects that neuropsychology can employ in order to build a global theory of the production of 
behaviour by the brain. Nonetheless, we should be able to go further by applying our 
procedure to distinguish between non-pathological but distinct realizers as well. Since, as 
outlined in section 1, differences in composition imply causal differences, we should be able 
to find critical situations where differentiations in the structure of normal brains are linked 
with specific cognitive abilities that manifest themselves in certain behavioural effects under 
specific circumstances. These behavioural differences can then be employed to construct 
more finely grained sub-descriptions of our traditional functional descriptions. This procedure 
can in principle be reproduced down to the physical description of the brain. Of course, 
functional descriptions matching physical differences have to be extremely detailed, but, 
again, that’s a practical problem, not a principled one speaking against reduction. 
5. Conclusion 
As argued in this paper, we can achieve a conservative reduction of psychology to 
neuropsychology by means of functional sub-types by respecting the following guidelines. 
First of all, ordinary psychology has to be arranged in accordance with the standard 
functionalist interpretation of the special sciences, using common-sense functionalism or 
scientific functionalism. Mental properties are thus identified through their characteristic 
effects. Second, neuropsychology explains how a specific brain structure produces certain 
behaviour and why neurological variations lead to variations in the way of producing the 
behaviour in question. Third, we can construct functionally defined sub-types of mental types 
using standard cognitive tests in order to achieve coextension of sub-types, whose description 
is couched in the vocabulary of common-sense functionalism, and the corresponding 
neuropsychological descriptions. Those cognitive tests are designed to grasp functional side-
effects produced by specific neuropsychological realizations of mental types. Ultimately, 
since any compositional differences imply causal differences, it should be possible to 
replicate this procedure in order to reduce neuropsychological descriptions to some more fine-
grained neuroscientific descriptions, and, in the last resort, to a physical description of the 
brain at the molecular level. 
References 
Bechtel, W. & Mundale, J. (1999), ‘Multiple realizability revisited: linking cognitive and neural states’, 
Philosophy of Science, 66, pp. 175-207.  
Bedeschi, M. F., Bonaglia, M. C., Grasso, R., Pellegri, A., Garghentino, R. R., Battaglia, M. A., Panarisi, A. M., 
DiRocco, M., Ballotin, U., Bresolin, N., Bassi, M. T. & Boratti, R. (2006), ‘Agenesis of the corpus 
callosum: clinical and genetic study in 63 young patients’, Pediatric Neurology, 34, pp. 186-94. 
 Psycho-neural reduction through functional sub-types  14
Bickle, J. (1998), Psychoneural reduction: the new wave (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).  
Blakemore, S. J., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnston, E. C. & Frith, C. D. (2000), ‘The perception of self-produced 
sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucination and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown 
in self-monitoring’, Psychological Medicine, 30, pp. 1131-39.  
Craver, C. F. (2007), Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
Daprati, E., Sirigu, A., Pradat-Diehl, P., Franck, N. & Jeannerod, M. (2000), ‘Recognition of self-produced 
movement in a case of severe neglect’, Neurocase, 6, pp. 183-201.  
Dobyns, W. B. (1996), ‘Absence makes the search grow longer’, American Journal of Human Genetic, 58, pp. 
7-16.  
Esfeld, M. & Sachse, C. (2007), ‘Theory reduction by means of functional sub-types’, International Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science, 21, pp. 1-17.  
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Frith, C. D., Decety, J., Georgieff, N., D’Amato, T. & Jeannerod, M. (2004), ‘Neural 
correlates of action attribution in schizophrenia’, Psychiatric research: Neuroimaging, 131, pp. 31-44.  
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Frith, C. D., Decety, J. & Jeannerod, M. (2003), ‘Modulating the 
experience of agency’, Neuroimage, 18, pp. 324-33.  
Franck, N., Farrer, C., Georgieff, N., Marie-Cardine, M., Daléry, M., D’Amato, T. & Jeannerod, M. (2001), 
‘Defective recognition of one’s own actions in patients with schizophrenia’, American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 158, pp. 454-59.  
Frith, C. D. & Dolan, R. (1996), ‘The role of the prefrontal cortex in higher cognitive functions’, Brain 
Research: Cognitive Brain Research, 7, pp. 1505-12.  
Jeannerod, M. (2003), ‘The mechanism of self-recognition in humans’, Behavioral Research, 142, pp. 1-15.  
Kim, J. (1998), Mind in a physical world. An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).  
Kim, J. (1999), ‘Making sense of emergence’, Philosophical Studies, 95, pp. 3-36.  
Kim, J. (2005), Physicalism, or something near enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press).  
Kolb, B. & Whishaw, I. (2003), Fundamentals of human neuropsychology (New York: Worth).  
Lewis, D. (1980), ‘Mad pain and Martian pain’, in: N. Block (ed.), Readings in the philosophy of psychology. 
Volume 1 (London: Methuen), pp. 216-22. Reprinted in D. Lewis (1983), Philosophical papers. Volume 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 122-30. 
Lewis, D. (1994), ‘Lewis, David: Reduction of mind’, in: S. H. Guttenplan (ed.), A companion to the philosophy 
of mind (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 412-31. Reprinted in D. Lewis (1999), Papers in metaphysics and 
epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 291-324. 
Purves, D., Augustine, G. J., Fitzpatrick, D., Katz, L. C., McMantia, A. S. & McNamara, J. O. (2002), 
Neurosciences (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale).  
Sachse, C. (2007), Reductionism in the philosophy of science (Frankfurt, Main: Ontos).  
Sirigu, A., Daprati, E., Pradat-Diehl, P., Franck, N. & Jeannerod, M. (1999), ‘Perception of self-generated 
movement following left parietal lesion’, Brain, 122, pp. 1867-74.  
Sperry, R. W., Gazzaniga, M. S. & Bogen, J. E. (1969), ‘Interhemispheric relationship: the neocortical 
commissures; syndrome of hemisphere disconnection’, in: P. J. Vinken & G. W. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of 
clinical neurology (Amsterdam: North Holland), pp. 273-90. 
 
 
